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Although American health policy debates address similar problems to other developed nations, 
it has factual and ideological specificities. I agree with Chinitz and Rodwin on the dominance of 
micro-economics thinking. However, I am not certain that learning from management theory or 
modifying medical education will be powerful enough to change the system. The vested interests 
of the stakeholders are too powerful, the more so when they are supported by economists who 
ideologically reinforce them and by neglecting the fact that the basic premises of market ideology 
are false when applied to medical care. There is enough empirical evidence to support that but, 
apparently, these facts do not dent these beliefs.
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In every developed country, health policy debates address similar topics: the role of prevention, the treatment of chronic diseases, uncoordinated care, and the control of 
(public) costs. Those debates often, proceed as if lessons can 
be drawn and applied from promising national experiences 
abroad. In the case of the U.S., for structural as well as 
ideological reasons, healthcare debates are distinctive even 
when the topics look very similar.
World leader in medical research and technology—as well as 
the most diverse and innovative country for organizational 
innovations—the U.S. health performance is poor in many 
respects. Average life expectancy at birth lags behind Japan 
(5 years) and Western European countries (3 years). Medical 
(not health) expenditures are the highest in the world (over 
17% of GNP or about 830 billion dollars), with an impressive 
gap between the U.S. and the next two highest spenders 
Netherlands and France, both about 12% of GNP. It is in this 
respect that it is fair to claim that the overall effectiveness of 
the U.S. system is poor. There is nothing new in this succinct 
description; it has broadly applied to the last 40 years, during 
which the high rate of medical inflation in the U.S. became 
one of its most salient features.
Chinitz and Rodwin (1) offer four reasons for the failure of 
current ideas and models to effectively reform healthcare 
in the U.S.: “1) the dominance of microeconomic thinking 
in health policy analysis and design; 2) the lack of learning 
from management theory and comparative case studies; 3) 
the separation of HPAM from the rank and file of healthcare; 
and 4) the failure to expose medical students to issues of 
HPAM”. Indeed these are part of the explanation for why, over 
and over again, the same debates take place, the same beliefs 
diffuse and the same types of research projects are, by cross-
national standards, amply financed. The first reason is indeed 
convincing, the second and the third are fair hypotheses, but 
not the last ones. Moreover, the article’s interesting analysis 
does not explain what could or should be done to reverse the 
great stability if not inertia of this American system. And I 
believe this conclusion holds even after taking into account 
Obamacare.
As Marcel Proust said: “facts don’t enter the world of our beliefs”. 
Chinitz and Rodwin (1) accurately observe that “health 
policy returns cyclically to financial incentives” despite the 
lack of evidence of the effectiveness of such incentives. Pay 
for performance is a mechanism to remunerate doctors for 
what they should do anyway. Co-payment, at best, delays the 
first visit to a doctor, but most patients are not good judges 
of what should be done for their health. Most people will 
get to a doctor if there is substantial suffering. But pain is 
not an accurate sign for the severity of a disease and if one 
waits too long because of a high co-payment, it can also 
be too late. When, after a first visit, the patient enters the 
medical industrial complex, he or she has little or no control 
of what is prescribed and co-payments do not “moderate” 
ensuing expenditures. Pushing the argument to its extreme, 
as Archibald Cochrane stated: “you don’t prevent people 
from dying by increasing the price of coffins”. To put it more 
mildly, when there is a question of life and death, patients and 
families will be disposed to sell whatever they have or borrow 
as much as they can to pay for costly treatment. This happens 
in much poorer countries in Africa or Asia, but it arises even 
in America. A person who might die tomorrow of a curable 
disease has an infinite discount rate and is indeed ready to 
spend whatever he has! 
Medical systems with completely free access at the point of 
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service – as in the British National Health System or Canada’s 
Medicare – are much cheaper than the American or the 
French arrangements where insured face high or moderate 
co-payments. This again is not new: Jost (2) and Marmor (3), 
among others, underlined that there is no empirical evidence 
to “the contention that regulated competition among health 
insurers restrains inflation through consumer pressures”. Not 
only does so-called “consumer-driven-managed-competition” 
increase administrative costs for the insurance companies by 
at least 10% of their total revenue1, but also those companies 
have shown little or no interest to pressure health professions, 
hospitals or the pharmaceutical industry to reduce costs 
as long as clients can and do pay. The dominant interest of 
insurance firms is annual profit and market share—the more 
expensive healthcare, the better. And finally, co-payment is 
fiscally regressive, harming poor and chronically ill patients 
more than the financially and medically better off. It is both 
unfair and inefficient but still promoted by prominent figures 
in the political class and the media in America (and in other 
nations)!
Chinitz and Rodwin (1), after Kenneth Arrow, also remind 
us of the importance of information asymmetry in health 
and medical care, which is still a major problem in health 
policy. I do not think, however, that the solution they suggest 
will help much in reducing that asymmetry, with or without 
financial incentives. Health Information Technology (HIT) 
contributes to the sharing of information between health 
professionals and facilitates their coordination. It does not 
inform the patient or increase his capacity enough to judge if 
the care he received were appropriate. There has, to be sure, 
been a reduction of information asymmetry for patients with 
chronic diseases through the efforts of health professionals 
and patient’s associations. General practitioners play a key 
role in the system as they control medical prescriptions and 
treatments on behalf of their patients. Therefore, the issues are 
more about access to Internet sites and control of prescription 
and not so much electronic medical records.
My final comments turn to microeconomics concepts and 
tools in health policy: I believe that the authors are too kind in 
their perspective. I would argue that it is a professional error 
for any social scientist to hypothesize that an actor, even when 
a patient, could be “irrational”. Without the hypothesis of 
rationality, there are no social sciences. So, when an economist 
assumes that a patient is not rational, he should rather look at 
his discipline’s hypotheses that manufacture distorted lenses. 
As far as the “lack of comparatives studies of healthcare 
organizations”, I agree with Chinitz and Rodwin that we 
need more rigorous research beyond sporadic case studies. 
Having spent a major part of my professional life on that 
topic, I believe the concepts used in most of the comparative 
work are poorly defined and limited in scope, as Rose and 
Mackenzie (4) underlined: “it is necessary to define concepts 
before engaging in comparisons”. The major problem is thus 
conceptual rather than methodological, even if a good 
methodology is a necessary condition for cross-national 
comparative analysis. With Sicotte (5) and Guisset et al. (6), I 
also believe that, if any, the Parsonian model of social action is 
more appropriate than most models currently and commonly 
used. A hospital, for example, is a complex organization that 
has to pursue broad (and often not precisely defined) goals, 
acquire resources, get the support of the community as well 
as its employees, be compatible with existing social norms, 
innovate, organize the division of labor, define mechanisms 
of coordination (values, rules, information systems), as well as 
standards of quality of care it produces. Medical institutions 
are thus multidimensional and, again, not comprehensible by 
a limited rational/goal model that focuses only on financial 
and economic indicators. Porter and Lee (7) amuse me when 
they claim that market conditions will achieve the “clear 
goals of value for patients”. Obviously they have not spent 
a good part of their life in hospitals. What is “clear” when 
death is around the corner? What do patients value besides 
a reduction of their suffering, hopefully being cured and 
survive? Values, attitudes, power, culture, and the social 
norms of both patients and the medical professionals play 
intricate roles. Nurses and doctors try to cure and sometimes 
they succeed, but most of the time they just provide the care 
they have been taught, and that is what is expected. What is 
the “clear” value of a smile or a thoughtful gesture? Utilitarian 
reductionism is not only limited in scope but also morally 
unbearable. Even in France, a very centralized country with a 
single recruitment system for public hospitals administrators, 
there are important cultural nuances that reflect in the style of 
hospital management between the North, with a predominant 
legal-rational style of operation mode and the political South, 
which is more sensitive to the influence of lobbies.
There are always several intertwined levels and dimensions 
of management; the economic dimension of the production 
of care is just one of them. Besides that, what is important 
is often hidden. In 1978 Italy reformed its health system by 
largely copying what it took to be the British National Health 
Service. But, in doing so, the Italians forgot that they were 
not British! Among many other indicators, the operational 
management of a waiting list does not reflect the same rigor in 
different countries. As Theodore Marmor puts it, it is difficult 
to learn from a system, when the actors themselves do not 
understand why it works the way it does.
Finally, I do not believe that adding considerations of cost and 
access in the training of medical professionals would change 
much if anything. Doctors or nurses have their own definition 
of “quality” and are trained to improve it, as Chinitz and 
Rodwin suggest. It would not do harm if managers knew more 
about “quality”. However, I do not expect medical schools 
to expand their curriculum with more training in public 
health—in general or in health economics in particular—
for medical professionals unless the trainees want to stop 
practicing medicine and desire to manage it. The paradigm 
of medical care is dual: doctors and nurses treat their patients. 
They apply general knowledge to a unique case. Of course, 
nowadays most of that knowledge does not come from case 
studies, but rather from cohort and controlled experiments. 
Nonetheless, their unit of analysis (a specific individual) 
is very different from the abstract categories used in public 
health. Public health uses social sciences concepts2 to explain 
medical variables. Doctors are in a profession where they are 
expected to treat patients whatever their age, social class, or 
marital status. As recent British experience shows, if there are 
public policy concerns about prescribing an expensive drug 
with low effectiveness, the constraints have to be placed at 
a political level, not at an individual one. Doctors treat with 
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what they know and what they have. Treatment costs are 
not their primary concern. Besides, when care is free at the 
point of service, there is enough international data on health 
expenditures to support the claim that a free system for the 
patient is not necessarily an expensive one for the nation. 
As to public health spending, which are expenditures financed 
by taxes, the U.S. is not that far behind other industrialized 
nations. In fact, even before Obama’s reform, American 
public expenditures on healthcare (44% of 17%= 7.48%) was 
very similar to Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) average (75% of 10%= 7.50%) and 
total expenditures were much higher (8)! 
Finally, going back to the Parsonian model of social action, 
I doubt that American medicine would change much if 
medical professionals could speak the language of hospital 
administrators. In my research on power and innovations 
in American hospitals (9), I did not find any difference in 
the pattern of professional behavior between hospitals CEO 
with a medical or a business degree. The role rather than 
the professional background dominated. Institutions are 
instruments for arbitrating different sources of legitimacy, 
not to promote role confusion. But since the dominant 
American ideology is market related, the doctors have become 
“suppliers” and the patients “customers”. With this language, 
“Medicine becomes then just another business”, albeit a 
service business. This refashioned language came itself to 
threaten the professional ethos of medicine. The idea of a 
self-regulating profession not only was held up to standards 
it often did not meet, but over time the notion that medical 
care should be treated like any other commercial enterprise 
has taken root (10).
Comparing the three countries separated by the same 
language (Britain, Canada and the U.S.) – to adapt Churchill’s 
expression – Tuohy (11) showed the importance of the 
initial conditions in shaping a system. Marmor and Klein 
(3) illustrate also that, under certain exceptional conditions, 
ideas can shape the creation of powerful institutions. But, 
when these institutions grow they create interests that will 
protect their position (12) and, indeed, the vested interests of 
America’s insurance industry, the pharmaceutical industry, 
the hospital industry and the medical professions are huge. 
They do seek—and find—economists who ideologically 
reinforce these interests. And there are, of course, scholars and 
politicians such as Ted Kennedy, who long ago showed that 
the basic premises of market ideology are false when applied 
to most medical care. But they have been unable to stimulate a 
serious national debate. Worse yet, the only vocal ideas again 
Obama’s reform came from extremist (or strong?) pro-market 
advocates. Let us hope that one day, soon, a serious political 
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Endnotes
1. Administrative costs related to the financing of healthcare is 2% in England, 
5.6% in France and around 15% in the U.S. for the insurance side, but it is 
between 25% and 30% when one considers also the administrative side in 
health institutions. If, in an American hospitals with 900 beds there are 1,300 
billing clerks, the equivalent in France is around 30 with also a Diagnosis-
Related Group (DRG) system.
2. From demography (age, gender), sociology (level of education, social class), 
economics (income) social-psychology (attitude), ethology, etc.
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